Recent Decisions by Gertner, Marc et al.
INCOME TAx-DEDCTIBILITY OF LEGAL EXPENSE
As A GENERAL BUSINESS EXPENSE
Petitioner was a professional dancer of noted repute. In 1949 he
was engaged to perform in Greenwich, Connecticut. Following the an-
nouncement of the concert a resident of Greenwich made several state-
ments in local newspapers alleging that the petitioner was a pro-Com-
munist, that his performances were un-American, and that he was prone
to interrupt his performances and give party line speeches. Petitioner's
concert manager and lawyer advised him that unless he brought a legal
action to clear himself of these charges, his professional career would
be placed in jeopardy. The petitioner did commence a libel suit, but the
jury was unable to reach a verdict and no further action was taken. As
a result of this adverse publicity, his professional bookings ceased, and
he was unable to earn a living. In determining his income for 1949,
the petitioner deducted the sum of $1,200 paid as legal expenses in the
libel action as a business expense. The Commissioner disallowed this
deduction and assessed a deficiency. Held: the legal expenses so incurred
were an ordinary and necessary business expense and hence deductible
from gross income. Draper v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.-4#26 (1956).
The petitioner claimed this deduction for legal expenses under
Section 162 (a) of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code, the general section
allowing deductions for trade and business expenses. This section provides,
"There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade
or business . . ." This section, like the analagous provision in the 1939
Code, 1 sets forth only the general rule, with a few specific deductible
expenses. The Regulations interpreting these sections merely paraphrase
the code provisions with a few additional examples.'
It is well established that legal expenses, incurred as a direct result
of the normal activities of a trade or business, constitute a justifiable
business expense deduction.3 Each case and each deduction, however, must
be determined on its own particular facts as to whether it does in fact
constitute an ordinary and necessary expense in carrying on a business.
The facts in the instant case are striking. The petitioner was a highly
successful public performer with a substantial income derived therefrom.
As a result of the widespread circulation of the challenged statements,
he was unable to -secure further engagements and his income declined
severely. He was told by his legal and theatrical advisors that legal action
to clear himself was the only way he could ever regain his prior status
1 INT. REV. CODE, of 1939, Section 23 (a) (1) 53 Stat. 12 (now INT. REV.
CODE of 1954 §162a).
2 U.S. Treas. Proposed Reg. §1.162-1 (1956) ; U.S. Treas. Reg. 118 §39.23
(a) (1) (1951); U.S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.23 (a) (1) (1941); U.S. Treas. Reg.
103 §19.23 (a) (1) (1940).
3 Heininger v. Commissioner, 320 U.S. 467 (1940); Kornhauser v. U.S., 276
U.S. 144 (1927)- S'alt v. Commissioner, 118 T.C. 182 (1952).
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and income. Perhaps the court was overemphatic when it stated, "We
conclude on the record that the petitioners concern was solely with
his continued business success as a public performer." No doubt he was
also concerned with his private good name and reputation. On these
facts, however, it may reasonably be determined that he was primarily
motivated by a desire to regain his professional standing and the resultant
income. The legal action was directly connected with his business, for
in the view of his advisors he would lose his business completely without
it. The libel action was commenced primarily to protect and restore
his business and income, and this clearly is an ordinary and necessary
expense.
In any case, the determination of the validity of a deduction of legal
expenses under Int. Rev. Code Section 162 (a) involves two distinct
steps. In the first place, it must be ascertained what is meant by the terms
"ordinary and necessary" as they modify business expense. Secondly, it
must be determined whether the operative facts in any case fall within
this meaning.
The courts on several occasions have been called upon to define
and explain the meaning of the words "ordinary and necessary" business
expenses when referring to legal expenses. An excellent discussion of this
question is found in Welch v. Commissioners. "Now, what is ordinary,
though there must be a strain of consistency within it, is none the less a
variable affected by time and place and circumstance. Ordinary in this
context does not mean that the payments must be habitual or normal in
the sense that the same taxpayer will have to make them often. I lawsuit
affecting the safety of a business may happen once a lifetime. The counsel
fees may be so heavy that repetition is unlikely. None the less the expense
is an ordinary one because we know from experience that payments for
such a purpose, whether the amount is large or small, are common and
accepted means of defense against attack." (Emphasis added) This
language was quoted with approval in Deputy, Aidministratrix v,. DuPont.5
In a later case,0 the court makes it clear that "there is no one absolute
interpretation of the words 'ordinary and necessary'" as used in Section
23 (a) (1) of the 1939 Code. The court goes on, however, to cite
Ieininger v. Commission-r and Deputy Administratrix v. DuPont,8
as stating the most common and preferred interpretation, that of using the
words in their commonly accepted meaning.
This interpretation necessarily leads the court to view the decisive
issue as one of fact. More explicitly, in any case where the taxpayer claims
a deduction of legal expenses as an ordinary and necessary business ex-
pense, the court must look to the relevant facts of the situation to de-
4 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
5 308 U.S. 140 (1940).
6Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 921 (1949).
7 su1ra, Note 3.
8 supra, Note 5.
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termine if the expense was really ordinary and necessary, using those
words in their commonly accepted meaning. In the principal case, the
facts were such as to bring the deduction within the terms and meaning
of the code provision. A slight deviation from the factual context of the
legal expense might lead to a different judgment. This can be seen from
a careful examination of the strikingly similar, but significantly differ-
ent case of Kleinschmidt v. Commissioner.9 In that case the taxpayer was
a candidate for circuit judge. After certain allegedly libelous statements
were made about him, he instituted three separate libel action against the
publishers of the statements. The expenses of these actions were claimed
as a business deduction."0 The court in this case held against the tax-
payer, finding that the expenses were not ordinary and necessary expenses
of carrying on his business. In this case the expenses were not incurred
to augment his law practice. His business, and the conduct thereof, were
not involved in the libel actions. Rather, these actions and the damages
sought were to recompense the taxpayer for the loss of good name and
reputation. The court concluded by stating, "We can not agree that
these expenditures were ordinary and necessary business expenses of
practicing law under any commonly accepted meaning of the terms. The
expenditures were not made as an incident to earning income in the
practice of law and Section 23 confines deductible expenses solely to
outlays in the effort or services. . . from which income flows." See also,
Lloyd v Commnissioner."
Although instant case was properly decided, the extent to which it
is authority in future cases is restricted by the fundamental fact that each
case involving such a deduction must be decided on its own facts. It is the
application of the operative facts of any case to the terms "ordinary and
necessary" business expense used in their commonly accepted meaning
which determines the validity of any deduction of legal expenses as a
general business deduction.
Marc Gertnwr
9 supra, Note 6.
losupra, Note 1.
11 55 F. 2d 842 (1932).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-INJURY CONSTRUED-
OVEREXERTION NOT COMPENSABLE WHEN No ANTECEDENT
ACCIDENT CAUSES THE INJURY
Plaintiff presented a claim to the Industrial Commission of Ohio
for an injury sustained while employed as a "swing line man" on a boom.
The boom was operated by two lines each of which was wrapped around
a steam operated spool. As plaintiff manually applied tension to the
lines the resulting friction between the spools and the lines moved the
boom. Nine weeks prior to the date of plaintiff's injury the boom became
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twisted and unbalanced from a heavy load, and thereafter one of the
lines was wrapped around two spools, requiring plaintiff to exert a greater
pull to achieve the desired motion of the boom. On May 8, 1951, while
applying tension to the double rigged line, plaintiff suffered an injury
which is described in the stipulations as "a strain in the left arm which
has been determined to be a traumatic disturbance of the brachial plexus
and further described as a sensory neuritis and impaired sensation in-
volving the median nerve." The Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the
Industrial Commission's denial of the claim. Held, plaintiff is not en-
titled to compensation since there was no evidence either of any external
and accidental means which caused the injury, or of a sudden mishap
occasioning the increased effort or strain. Dripps v. Industrial Com-
mission, 165 Ohio St. 407, 135 N.E. 2d 873 (1956).
It should be noted that not every injury occurring while an em-
ployee is within the course of his employment entitles the employee to
compensation under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act.' Before
compensation is obtained, it must be determined that the injury was
"occasioned in the course of [the] employment"' 2 and that the injury is
"any injury received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured
employee's employment."3 The Workmen's Compensation Act was in-
tended to provide compensation in a broader range of cases than merely
those where the employer was at fault.4 The Ohio Supreme Court has
often stated that inasmuch as the Workmen's Compensation Law is
remedial in nature, its provisions "are to be construed liberally in favor
of an injured workman seeking benefits thereunder."5
The problem of distinguishing between compensable and non-
compensable injuries originally arose in Ohio because the statutes pro-
viding compensation for occupational diseases were passed after the
legislature had provided compensation for occupational injury.6 In the
case of Industral Commission v. Cross' the employee contracted typhoid
fever from drinking water in the course of his employment. Compen-
sation was denied since there was no "injury". The court reasoned that
I OHIo REv. CODE §§4123.01 et. seq.
2 0HI0 CoNsTrrUTIoN Art. II §35.
3 OHIO Ray. CODE §4123.01. This language was formerly part of OHIO GFN.
CODE §1465-68, the remainder of which is now OHio Ray. CODE §4123.54.
4 Industrial Commission v. Weygandt, 102 Ohio St. 1, 130 N.E. 38 (1921).
The only remaining element of fault is in the event the employer has failed to
adhere to the specifications of safety requirements promulgated by the Industrial
Commission. OHIO CoNsrrrrrioN Art. II §35.
5 Bowling v. Industrial Commission 145 Ohio St. 23, 60 N.E. 2d 479 (1945);
Industrial Commission v. Flynn, 129 Ohio St. 220, 194 N.E. 420 (1935) ; Industrial
Commission v. McWhorter, 129 Ohio St. 40, 193 N.E. 620 (1935); State ex rel
Juergens v. Industrial Commission, 127 Ohio St. 524, 189 N.E. 445 (1934).
6 102 Ohio Laws 524, Act of May 31, 1911, Industrial Commission v. Brown,
92 Ohio St. 309 (1915).
7 104 Ohio St. 561, 136 N.E. 283 (1922).
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if Art. II §35 of the Constitution separated injury and occupational
disease, no disease was included in the word injury, except insofar as-an
injury may be the cause of a disease, such as bloodpoisoning. In Renkel
v. Industrial Commission,s in considering whether tuberculosis contracted
from inhaling iron particles was an injury, the court denied compen-
sation using the following language: "Though the word 'accident' is
not used in our statute, nor in the constitutional provision referred to, nor
the word 'accidental' in connection with the word 'injury', yet it seems
clear that the distinction of 'injury' from occupational disease, . . .
warrants the conclusion that 'disease' is not included in the term 'injury'
. In Industrial Commission v. Russell,9 the court denied compen-
sation to a movie projectionist whose eyes were blinded by continued ex-
posure to ultra-violet light, for the reason that there had been no trau-
matic injury nor any accident which caused the blindness."0 By 1936 the
Court had developed the rule that for a workman to recover, there must
be evidence which establishes a sudden chance happening at a particular
time and place causing a traumatic injury accidental in origin and cause."
This restricted interpretation of the word injury apparently moved
the legislature to add the following sentence to the act: "The term
'injury' as used in this section and in the Workmen's Compensation Act
shall include any injury received in the course of, and arising out of,
the injured employee's employment."' 2 The addition of the words "any
injury" and "arising out of" would liberalize the word injury as pre-
viously defined by the courts.' "
The first case which presented the problem of defining injury under
the new amendment was Malone v. Industrial Commission.' The plain-
tiff died from heat exhaustion incurred while performing his usual duties
as a foundry pourer in a room of 113 degrees temperature. The court
allowed compensation defining injury as traumatic harm which is acci-
dental in character in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap,
holding that the injury is accidental if something unusual occurs "which
8 109 Ohio St. 152, 141 N.E. 834- (1923).
9 111 Ohio St. 692, 146 N.E. 305 (1924).
10 It should be noted that the absence of the word accident in the Ohio
Statute is somewhat significant in that only 6 other states do not have the word
accident or accident in the statutory coverage section.
11 Matczak v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 139 Ohio St. 181, 38 N.E.
2d 1021 (1943); Cordray v. Industrial Commission 139 Ohio St. 173, 38 N.E. 2d
1017 (1942) ; Gwaltney v. General Motors Corp. 137 Ohio St 354, 30 N.E. 2d 342
(1940). Industrial Commission v. Lambert 126 Ohio St. 501, 186 N.E. 89 (1933).
Cardio-vascular cases are purposely omitted since they present separate problems
regarding antecedent physical condition and causal connection with the employment.
12117 Ohio Laws 109, OHIo REV. ConE §4123.01(D).
13 In this regard, see the dissent of Judge Zimmerman in Dripps v. Industrial
Commission, note 1, supra.
14 140 Ohio St. 292, 43 N.E. 2d 266 (1942).
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produces the injury or from which the injury results."' 5 The opinion
explains that accident and trauma are necessary ingredients of injury in
order to differentiate disease, but that "accidental and traumatic injuries
. are compensable whether they are the result of accidental means or
the result of the mishap itself proximately causing the damage or harm."' 8
The necessary causal connection1 7 between the employment and the in-
jury was defined by the court in terms of the greater hazards of the
employment compared to those general hazards which the public en-
counters.1 8 Thus the Malone case accomplished the desired result of
expanding the definition of injury, but reached the objective by bending
earlier terminology and by changing "accidental in origin and cause" to
"accidental in character and result."'' 9
The first effects of the Malone case were felt in Maynard v. The
B. F. Goodrich Co." where the plaintiff was awarded compensation after
unfavorable action by the Industrial Commission. Plaintiff, whose job
was to lift heavy objects, injured his back while helping to lift a heavy
roll of fabric. The court stated in the syllabus that no causal connection
exists to satisfy the requirement "arose out of" unless the injury is "acci-
dental in character and result". In the opinion, in which the entire court
concurred, it was explained that Industrial Commission v. Franken2 '
15 Malone v. Industrial Commission, note 14 supra, syllabus, paragraphs
1 and 2. See 1 Larson's Workman's Compensation Law §37.20 for a detailed
analysis of the concept of accident.
16 Malone v. Industrial Commission, 140 Ohio St. 292, 300, 43 N.E. 2d 266,
271 (1942) Query whether the word "any" qualifying "injury" obviates the need
for trauma as a distinction between "injury" and "disease" (other than occupa-
tional). The qualification "arising out of the employment" appears to be sufficient
to separate the compensable from the non-compensable. See Bollinger v. Wagaraw
Bldg. and Supply Co., 122 N.J.L. 512, 6 A. 2d 396, note 31 infra, and Renkel v.
Industrial Commission, note 9 supra.
17,"Causal connection" as used here is only a second cousin of 'proximate
cause" in tort. There is no element of foreseeability in the term, "arise out of the
employment." See 1 LARSON'S WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw §6.50.
18 This aspect of "arising out of" probably serves as a basis for the
questionable distinction between "usual" and "unusual" exertion in determining
whether an injury is compensable. Matczak v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.,
note 12 sup a.
19 In a short concurring opinion in the Malone case, 140 Ohio St. 292, 304,
43 N.E. 2d 266, 272 (1942) Judge Mathias states that under the new legislative
definition "inquiry is . . . limited to determining that the physical disability in
question was caused by trauma and did not result from disease, and whether it
occurred in the course of and arose out of the employment". Although this is a
somewhat oversimplified approach, it reflects an appreciation of the overlooked
opportunity for a "let's-begin-again" approach to defining injury. See comment
by Stephen D. Hadley, When Is An Injury Not an Injury, 25 Ohio Op. 485.
20 144 Ohio St. 22, 56 N.E. 2d 195 (1944-).
21 126 Ohio St. 299, 185 N.E. 199 (1933). Compensation denied for heart
failure occasioned by lifting heavy dies.
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and Matczak v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co." were not followed
inasmuch as the Malone case and the statute had removed the require-
ment that the injury be "accidental in origin and cause."
In Nelson v. Industrial Commission" compensation was denied a
62 year old millwright who died of a cerebral hemorrhage while
tightening some bolts in a normal manner because there was "an absence
of evidence showing that an accidental injury caused or contr buted to
the death" (emphasis supplied). Although the opinion indicates that a
person need not be struck by an outside agency, and that death on the
job does not of itself show a compensable injury, the concluding para-
graph states "the record . . . is absolutely devoid of any evidence of
accident . . . which directly caused or contributed to the decedent's
death." On the proven facts in this case, recovery was properly denied,
not because there was no antecedent accident, but because it was not
shown that the hemorrhage "arose out of the employment."
The Dripps case defines injury as "a physical or traumatic damage
or harm accidental in character and as a result of external and accidental
means in the sense of being the result of a sudden mishap, occurring by
chance, unexpectedly and not in the usual course of events, at a particular
time and place." 4 The second paragraph of the syllabus indicated that
injury resulting from overexertion is not compensable unless it appears
that "such increased effort o rstrain was occasioned by some sudden mis-
hap or unusual event."2" It is clear from the phrases "a result of external
and accidental means" and "occasioned by some sudden mishap", that
this holding has in effect overruled Malone v. Industrial Commission"°
insofar as injuries which are only the accidental, sudden, or unexpected
result of the employment are now excluded. Maynard v. B. F. Goodrich
Co." is clearly no longer of any effect, since its facts are nearly identi-
cal with the Dripps case.28
It should be pointed out that the "type" of injury sustained by
Dripps and Malone is the same. There was no accident, no specific un-
expected event which "caused" the injury. Both injuries were the un-
expected result of the employment. Malone worked in a torridly hot
room-Dripps worked pulling lines to run a boom. The Ohio Court
22 Note 12 supra. Compensation deiied for back injury sustained while
lifting reroll liners in usual manner.
23 150 Ohio St. 1, 80 N.E. 2d 430 (1948).
24 Dripps Y. Industrial Commission, note 1 supra, paragraph 1 of the
syllabus.
25 See also Artis v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 165 Ohio St. 412, 135
N.E. 2d 877 (1956).
26 Note 15, supra.
27 Note 18, supra.
28 In the Dripps case the court cited only Toth v. Standard Oil Co., 493
Ohio St. 463, 92 N.E. 2d 393 (1950) (paralysis resulting from anxiety over
investigation of fatal auto accident) and Nelson v. Industrial Commission, note 24
supra.
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has again made an accident as a cause of the injury a prerequisite to
compensation, while the Ohio Statute has never used the word accident
in discussing the coverage of the law.
2 9
It is submitted that the intent of the legislature would be better
implemented if the courts were to center their analysis on "arising out
of the employment" rather than on "accident" as cause or effect of the
injury.
J. Donald Cairns
2 9 A position completely contrary to the Dripps case has been taken by
New Jersey. In Bollinger v. Wagaraw Bldg. & Supply Co., 1272 NJ.L. 512,
6 A. 2d 396 (1939) the New Jersey court virtually read the requirement "by
accident" out of the statute, which required "injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of his employment". NEW JERSEY STAT. ANN. 34:15-7. Also see
Williams v. Industrial Commission, 95 Ohio App. 275, 119 N.E. 2d 126 (1953).
RECENT DEcIsIONs ToRTs--LTABILrrY OF CHARITABLE HosPITAL-
REPUDIATION OF IMMUNITY RULE
Plaintiff was a paying patient for surgery in the defendant corpo-
ration which maintained and operated a public charitable hospital.
Plaintiff alleged that as a result of negligence of defendant's employees,
he was permitted to fall from a hospital bed twice, whereby he was
injured. The defendant denied the allegation of negligence, and as a
separate defense pleaded non-liability as a matter of law because it was a
charitable institution. Plaintiff's demurrer to this separate defense was
overruled by the trial c3urt, and this decision was affirmed by the court
of appeals. The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed, holding that de-
fendant's claim of immunity from liability for negligence as a public
charitable hospital, ". . . does not state a defense and is subject to de-
murrer." Avellone v. St. John's Hospital, 165 Ohio St. 467, 135 N.E.
2d 410 (1956).
The Court cited and followed the reasoning of President and
Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes,' the landmark case in this
area, which started the movement for the repudiation of the rule ex-
empting charitable institutions from tort liability. The Ohio Court based
the repudiation of that rule on the changing social and economic con-
ditions of charitable hospitals and on the general trend of ". . legis-
lative and judicial policy in distribution losses incurred by individuals
through the operation of an enterprise among all who benefit by it rather
than in leaving them wholly to be borne by those who sustain them."'
The present availability of liability insurance to such institutions was also
cited as an important factor which made the immunity rule obsolete.3
1130 F. 2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
2 165 Ohio St. at 477.
3 But See Hines. Hospital Malpractice Liability Insurance, 23 Chi. Bar Record
135 (1953).
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The history of that rule may be traced to three early English cases.'
These decisions were repudiated in England,5 but were thereafter adopted
by two American courts,' apparently without knowledge of the English
reversal. The doctrine exempting charitable institutions from liability
gained an early foothold in Ohio in two lower court decisions. 7 When
the Supreme Court of Ohio considered and adopted the rule,' it did
so with full knowledge of its repudiation in England, and based its
decision on the proposition that charitable institutions should not be sub-
ject to the rule of respondcat superior because of the public policy favor-
ing the development of such institutions free from the dangers of
vicarious liability. Through the next forty-five years the rule was often
modified,9 and subjected to keen criticism.1"
The dissent in the Avdllone case suggests that abandonment of the
immunity doctrine should be effected by the legislature, not by the courts.
In a Vashington case" it was held on similar facts that since the rule
of non-liability of charitable institutions was a judicially established one,
it should be possible for courts to abrogate it. "We closed our court
room doors without legislative help, and we can likewise open them."'
2
4 Duncan v. Findlater, 7 Clark & Fin. 894-, 7 Eng. Rep. 934 (H. L. 1839);
The Feofees of Heriot's Hospital v. Ross, 12 Clark & Fin. 507, 8 Eng. Rep. 1508
(H.L. 1846); Holliday v. St. Leonard, 11 C.B., N.S. 192 (C.P. 1861).
5 Mersey Docks Trustees v. Gibbs, L.R. 1 H.L. 93 (1866) ; Foreman v. Mayor
of Canterbury, L.R. 6 Q.B. 214 (1871).
6 McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 (1876) ;
Perry v. House of Refuge, 63 Md. 20 (1885).
7 Connor v. The Sisters of the Poor of St. Francis, 7 Ohio N.P. 514 (1900) ;
Johnson v. Hospital, 12 Ohio Dec. N.P. 802 (1902).
8 Taylor v. Protestant Hospital Ass'n., 85 Ohio St. 90, 96 N.E. 1089 (1911).
9 Charitable hospital held liable where it was negligent in selection and
retention of its employees and injury resulted from the negligence of such persons.
Taylor v. Flower Deaconess Home, 104 Ohio St. 61, 135 N.E. 287 (1922). Rule of
non-liability held applicable to injuries to a patient's property. Rudy v. Hospital,
115 Ohio St. 539, 155 N.E. 126 (1926). Charitable hospital held liable for negligent
injury to a stranger to the charity. Sisters of Charity v. Duvelius, 123 Ohio St. 52,
173 N.E. 737 (1930). Immunity held not lost because the tort was committed
during non-charitable activities. Cullen v. Schmit, 139 Ohio St. 194, 39 N.E. 2d
146 (1942); Emrick v. Penn. R.R. Y.M.C.A., 69 Ohio App. 353, 43 N.E. 2d 733
(1942). Tort doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not available to a plaintiff suing
a charitable institution. Lakeside Hospital v. Kovar, 131 Ohio St. 333, 2 N.E. 2d
857 (1936); Waddell v. Y.W.C.A., 133 Ohio St. 601, 15 N.E. 2d 140 (1938). For
a comprehensive review of Ohio cases, see Note, 4 WESTERN Rgs. L. REv. 348
(1953) ; Note, 15 OHIO ST. L.J. 390 (1954).
10 President and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F. 2d 810
(D.C. Cir. 1942) ; Ball, The Liability of Charitable Institutions for Torts or Agents
and Servants, 38 Ky. L.U. 105 (1950) ; Note, 11 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1950) ; Note,
15 OHIO ST. L.J. 390 (1954); Note, 4 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 348 (1953); for
further references see PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS, page 784, n. 40
(2d cd. 1955).
1 1 Pierce v. Yakima Valley Etc. Ass'n., 43 Wash. 2d 162, 260 P. 2d 765 (1953).
121d. at 178. See also STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE LAW REVISION COM-
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Similarly the Ohio Supreme Court in Williams v. Tramsit Inc., con-
struing the Ohio Constitution 14 recently held that a plaintiff could
maintain an action for pre-natal injuries, even though no such remedy
had heretofore been recognized in Ohio. "No legislative action is re-
quired to authorize recovery for personal injuries caused by the negli-
gence of another. Such right was one existing at common law."15 The
instant case expresses the same philosophy as the Williams case with
respect to the power of courts to adapt the common law to modern
concepts of justice.
Thus the instant case discarded a rule of law which had set the
policy of Ohio decisions for forty-five years, and replaced it with a
modern rule of law geared to the realities and necessities of the times.
Although the case at bar concerned a hospital, it cannot be doubted that
all charitable institutions will be affected."0 The majority opinion, more-
over, suggests, though not explicitly, that the same rule would apply to
a non-paying patient of a charitable hospital."' The instant decision is
not so startling as it might appear because it does not overrule the funda-
mental doctrine of respondeat superior, but rather, eliminates an exception
to that doctrine. To say that this should be left for the legislature is to
misconceive the role of the courts under the common law system.
Bruno E. Voltolini
NnSsioN, 803-850 (1953) which after reviewing the law in every state made no
recommendation to the New York Legislature concerning the abolishment of the
rule.
13 1Z5 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E. 2d 334 (1949).
14 OHIO CONST. art. I, Sec. 16.
1 152 Ohio St. at 128.
16 165 Ohio St. at 479 (dissent).
IT7 Id. at 476, third paragraph.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION-
GUARANTEE TO INDIGENTS OF ADEQUATE APPELLATE REvIEW
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Petitioners, raising the issue under the Illinois Post Conviction
Hearing Act, alleged that the trial court's denial of their motion for a
free transcript on which to prosecute an immediate appeal from a con-
viction of armed robbery, violated the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the petition on the ground that no
substantial constitutional questions were raised. The United States Su-
preme Court granted certiorari. Held, 5-4 vacated and remanded: a
constitutional question had been raised, for, when a state grants the right
to appellate review in criminal cases, the Due Process and Equal Pro-
tection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require that indigent
1956]
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defendants be afforded some means of raising.any alleged error in the
trial court which could have been raised under the same circumstances
by a person of sufficient means. Griffin v. IlHinos, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
Review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a criminal
case, however grave the offense for which the accused is convicted, is
not a necessary element of due process of law.' The Supreme Court
has often, however, taken the position that once the right of appeal is
afforded by a state, it becomes but an additional step in one proceeding to
determine finally the guilt or innocence of the accused.2 Thus, as the
principal case clearly underlines, appellate procedure is subject to scrutiny
in determining whether or not a defendant has been afforded due process.
The Supreme Court has also emphasized that the states are to have
considerable latitude in hying down conditions on the exercise of appeal.'
These conditions must, of course, meet the minimum requirements of the
Equal Protection Clause.' However, conditions requiring payment of court
fees or posting, bonds have seldom been viewed as imposing invidious or
unreasonable classifications.'
Under Illinois appellate procedure, indigent defendants have been
entitled to a bare common law record' without cost, but review on such
record has been limited to errors appearing on the face thereof.7 In
addition, indigents are entitled to a free transcript on appeal of a death
sentence.' In the principal case, as no capital sentence was involved,
petitioners were not entitled to a free transcript and could not raise
the alleged errors of the trial court with a common law record, although
an appellant with funds could have secured a transcript and raised these
issues.
A legislature may classify litigation, and equal protection does not
require uniformity of procedure.' The majority of the court, however,
branded this scheme of legislation as arbitrary and unreasonable, pointing
out that the ability to pay costs in advance bears no rational relationship
1 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894); Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177
U.S. 155 (1900); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); Kahl v. Lehlback,
160 U.S. 293 (1895).
2 Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) ; Dowd v. United States ex rel.
Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951); Cockran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257 (1942);
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327 (1915).
3 See cases cited in note 1, supra.
4 See, e.g., Boykin v. Huff, 121 F. 2d 865 (1941) ; Vernon v. State, 245 Ala.
633, 18 So. 2d 388 (1944); State v. Janiec, 6 N.J. 608, 80 A. 2d 94 (1951), cert.
denied 341 U.S. 955 (1951).
5 Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921) ; Carr v. Lanagan, 50 F. Supp. 41
(1943) ; But cf. Jeffries v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 573, 132 P. 823 (1913).
6 The common law record in Illinois consists of the indictment, arraignment,
plea, verdict and sentence. People v. Loftus, 400 I1. 432, 81 N.E. 2d 495 (1948).
"Iibid.
8 ILL. REV. STAT., 1955, s. 38, §769a. See also ILL. Rv. STAT., 1955, 3. 37,
§163 f. Indigents may also obtain a free transcript under some circumstances
under the Illinois Post Conviction Hearing Act.
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to a defendant's guilt or innwcence. They held that the operation of the
statute results in discrimination against indigents by denying them adequate
appellate review.
The dissent, on the other hand, views any resulting classification
as reasonable in extending the full benefit of appeal to those convicted
of capital offenses as opposed to limits on the exercise of appeal by those
convicted of lesser offenses. "A policy of economy may be unenlightened,
but it is certainly not capricious."'" They see no duty imposed on the
states by the Constitution to remove the natural disabilities of indigents.
The direct effect of the decision on state legislation and court rules
in a number of states is obvious.11 However, its future effect in two other
areas may be even more significant:
First: does the decision open the way to collateral attack on a possibly
large number of convictions where the right to "adequate" appellate
review of trial court errors, now afforded recognition by the Fourteenth
Amendment, has been previously ignored? 2 Justice Frankfurter, in a
separate concurring opinion, suggested that it does give grounds for
collateral attack and urged that the construction given the Fourteenth
Amendment by the Court be limited to prospective application, except
in the case of the present appellant.
Second: does this decision justify a re-examination of the require-
ments of due process for the appointment of counsel in criminal cases at
both appellate and trial levels? At present, the state must appoint trial
counsel for indigent defendants in all capital cases33 and certain non-
capital cases when special circumstances exist.14 The Supreme Court held
in Betts v. Brady that in the usual non-capital case, it is not necessary
to provide counsel for the indigent, 5 and, by the same token, an indigent
has been held not to be entitled as a matter of right to the assistance of
counsel to prosecute an appeal in-criminal cases.16
The -principal case holds that due process guarantees adequate ap-
pellate review to indigents in non-capital cases to the point of providing
a free transcript if needed. This statement raises a logical query as to
9 Dohany v. Rogers, 281 U.S. 362 (1930).
10 Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting.
11A dissenting opinion points out that the laws of nineteen states will be
affected by the holding of the court. Ohio does not fall in this category. Onlo
REv. CODe, §2301.24 provides, "The compensation for transcripts made in criminal
cases, by request of the prosecuting attorney or the defendant, * * * shall be paid
from the county treasury and taxed and collected as other costs."
12 See note 11, supra. That code provision has been in effect since 1904.
97 Ohio Laws 178, 111 Ohio Laws 112, 120 Ohio Laws 448, 123 Ohio Laws 319,
126 Ohio Laws 37.
13 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
14 Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S. 773 (1949) ; Palmer v. Ashe, 342 U.S. 194 (1951).
15 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
1SErrington v. Hudspeth, 110 F. 2d 384, 127 A.L.R. 1467 (1940), cert. denied
310 U.S. 638 (1940).
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the effectiveness o.f appellate review without the assistance of counsel. Is
the Court now prepared to hold that he too must be provided if essential,
and would counsel not be essential in most cases?
So, .too, if due process may now possibly require the assistance of
counsel .to prosecute an appeal in both capital, and non-capital cases, under
the court's premise that.,appeal is but a stage of one proceeding, a basis
for.the abandonment of Betts v. Brady7 may have been established and
due process-may soon require assistance of counsel at the trial level in
criminal actions generally as well as in capital and exceptional cases.
Wil iam W. Wehr
1 7 Note '15, supra.
ADOPTION-INHERITANCE FROM ADOPTIVE PARENTS-EFFECT
OF READOPTION PRIOR TO THEIR DEATH
In proceedings.in Probate Court to determine the heirs at law of the
decedent, -complainant adopted child filed objections to a finding that
decedent had left no natural or adopted children upon her death-intestate
in 1952. He was adopted by decedent and her husband in 1918, re-
turned by them to his natural parents two weeks later, and was re-
adopted by the natural parents in 1920. On appeal, the Circuit Court
of Cook County held that the readoption of complainant by his- natural
parents did not alter.his right to inherit from his first adopting parents.
Certain blood relatives of decedent appealed to the Supreme Court of
Illinois. Held, a child, having been readopted prior to the death of his
first. adopting. parents, may not share, in their estate. In re Estate of
Lichtenberg, 131 N.E. 2d 487 (Ill. 1956).
This case represents the adoption by Illinois of the minority view
which denies a child the right of inheritance from his first adopting
parents when readopted prior to their death. The jurisdictions in which
this problem has arisen have had statutory provisions allowing a child to
inherit from his adoptive parents. The typical provision states in effect
that the adopting parents shall be deemed to stand in the place" of the
child's natural parents for purposes of inheritance.'
Those jurisdictions which recognize the right of inheritance point
out that by statutory provision, an adopted child has, with respect to his
adoptive parents, the same rights as a child born in lawful wedlock, and
according to previous decisions, retains the right to inherit from his
natural parents. They conclude by analogy that an adopted child after a
second adoption retains the right to inherit from his first adoptive parents.
2
1 ILL. REV. STAT., chap. 3, par. 165 (1955).
2 Villier v. Watson, 168 Ky. 631, 182 S.W. 869, L.R.A. 1918A, 820 (1916);
Dreyer v. Schrick, 105 Kan. 495, 185 P. 30 (1919) ; Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246,
178 N.W. 406 (1920); In re Sutton's Estate, 161 Minn. 426, 201 N.W. 925 (1925) ;
In re Estate of Egley, 16 Wash. 2d 681, 134 P. 2d 943, 132 A.L.R. 773 (1941),
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Illinois had also recognized the right of an adopted child to inherit
from his natural parents.' The principal case attempts to distinguish
these cases. In fact, the controversy found in the cases passing on this
question arises mainly from opposing efforts to distinguish and reconcile
the two situations. The following excerpts are examples.
The first case denying the right to inherit held that the second
adoption proceeding .. ipso facto had the effect of revoking or superseding
the order made in the first proceeding * * ,.,,4
The defect in that reasoning is that while a new domestic
relation is created, the first proceeding is not affected in any
particular by the second. The first proceeding stands for all
time * * * attended by the same legal consequences as the
birth of a child to the adopting parents.
5
By what process of reasoning can the conclision be
reached that a new order will put an end to all the rights,
duties and incidents of the contract (e.g. the duty to support
and educate) except the right to inherit?'
[The view which denies inheritance] is contrary to the
well established rule that an adopted child does inherit from
its natural parents * * * because a natural parent likewise is
not legally obligated to support and educate a child which has
been adopted.'
One situation depends on blood and birth, the other upon
consent and contract.
8
The Michigan Supreme Court, in reconsidering their holding in
In re Klapp's Estate9 which denied inheritance, refused to overrule on
the ground that the Klap case had stated a rule of property, but invitedlegislative re-examination.0 In re Meyers Estate" points out the
hesitancy with which this position was affirmed.
The principal case emphasizes that the first recognition of the right
to inherit in Villier v. T'Vatsog,12 was an extension, without distinguishing,
of Russell's 4dm'r v. Russell's Guardian,"3 which held that a child re-
adopted after the death of his first adopting parents could inherit from
noted 18 WASH. L. REv. 215 (1943) ; Coondradt v. Sailors, 186 Tenn. 294, 209 S.W.
2d 859, 2 A.L.R.. 2d 880 (1948) ; Hawkins v. Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S.W. 2d
733 (1951) ; In re Meyer's Estate, 205 Misc. 880, 129 N.Y.S. 2d 531 (1954).
3 In re Estate of Tilliski, 390 I1. 273, 61 N.E. 2d 24 (1945).
4 In re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N.W. 381, L.R.A. 1918A, 818 (1917).
5 Dreyer v. Schrick, note 2 supra.
6In re Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P. 2d 495, 132 A.L.R. 773 (1941),
noted 26 MINN. L. REV. 114 (1941), 16 Nona DAME LAWv. 240 (1941).
7 Hawkins v. Hawkins, note 2 supra.
s In re Talley's Estate, note 6 supra.
9 Note 4, supra.
20In re Carpenter's Estate, 327 Mich. 195, 41 N.W. 2d 349 (1950), noted
3 U. FLA. L. REV. 237 (1950).
11 Note 2, supra.
12 Ibid.
13 14 Ky. Law Rep. 236 (1892).
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their estate. In the latter case there is no doubt that the child's interest
in the estate of his first adopting parents had vested prior to the readoption.
After drawing further distinctions between the incidents of natural
and adoptive parenthood, the court points out that the Illinois Probate
Act makes no provision for inheriting from former adopting parents. The
enumeration of certain things in a statute implies the exclusion of all
others. The court concludes that recognition of a right of inheritance
in this situation would add confusion to a tranquil field of law.
In so far as the argument which supports inheritance by a child
from his first adopting parents when readopted prior to their death de-
pends on the analogy to inheritance by an adopted child from his natural
parents, Ohio Rev. Code §3107.13 precludes its assertion in Ohio.
C* * * a legally adopted child * * * shall cease to be treated as the child
of his natural parents for the purpose of intestate succession." Under
this section an adopted child ceases to be the child of his natural parents
for the purpose of each and every possibility of inheritance.14
If the issue were to be raised in Ohio, the argument would probably
center around inferences to be drawn from legislative silence on inherit-
ance from successive sets of adopting parents. It is submitted that the
clear import of the statute is that a child has but one set of parents from
whom to inherit.
William W. Wehr
14 Frantz v. Florence, Adm'r, 72 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 13 N.E. 2d 630 (1954-).
ADOPTION-EFFECT ON INHERITANCE
RIGHTS FROM NATURAL PARENTS
Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory judgment to determine
his rights to decedent's estate, claiming under the Ohio Statute of
Descent and Distribution. The facts were undisputed. Decedent was
the father of two sons, John "and William. William; father of the
plaintiff, died in 1945 survived by Alice his widow and the plaintiff.
In 1950 Alice married Dr. Frantz. In 1953 Dr. Frantz adopted the
plaintiff and in 1954 decedent died intestate. Plaintiff claimed an inter-
est in decedents estate under Ohio Rev. Code, Section 2105.06, as a
"descendant" of decedent's son William. The estate claimed that plain-
tiff's right to inherit through William, as his descendant, was abrogated
by Ohio Rev. Code, §3107.13--a statute relating to adoption. Held:
for the estate . ... as an adopted child ceases to be the child of his natural
parents for the purpose of each and every possibility of inheritance.
Frantz v. Florence, Admr. 72 Ohio L. Abs. 222, 131 N.E. 2d 630
(1954).
Prior to 1951 the inheritance rights of adopted children were
governed in Ohio by General Code, section 10512-23 which provided,
"... nothing in this act shall be construed as debarring a legally adopted
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child from inheriting property of its natural parents or kin ..... ." But
Ohio Rev. Code, §3107.13, the successor of General Code, section
8004-13, not only omitted the above quoted provision but provides,
"For the purpose of inheritance to ... a legally adopted child, such
child shall be treated the same as if he were the natural child of his
adopting parents, and shall cease to be treated as the child of his natural
parents for the purposes of intestate succession."
Plaintiff argued that although the new section forbade his succession
to the property of his natural parents, it did not forbid his succession to
the property of his natural grandparents. The force of this argument is
considerable in view. of the history of adoption statutes.
"The right of adoption ...was unknown to the common law of
England, and exists in this country . . .only by virtue of statute."
1
Adoption statutes originated during the latter half of the nineteenth
century. Although initially they had few provisions with respect to
inheritance rights, such provisions became common.2 Those provisions
which purported to take away the right of an adopted child to succeed
to the property of his blood kin the 'courts construed strictly so as to
protect the child's rights.3 For example, in In Re Darling4 the Court
held that although the statute as there construed prohibited a child from
succeeding to the property of his natural parents, it did not expressly
deny him the right to succeed to the property of other blood kin and
therefore that such right still existed. The reasons usually assigned for
such a construction are (1) that the statutes were enacted for the benefit
of adopted children 5 and (2) that the statutes are in derogation of the
common law.' The "sacredness" of blood lines has also often been given
as a reason,' but this idea was severly criticized in White v. Meyer.8
Plaintiff's justifications for a construction which would allow him to
inherit from his grandfather's estate seem inadequate, however, for
several reasons. Assuming that the statute should be strictly construed,
it seems difficult to imagine how the legislature could have been more
explicit in denying the plaintiff succession rights. Moreover, there is
doubt that the rule of strict construction is applicable.' Ohio Rev. Code,
§1.11 provides that remedial statutes are to be liberally construed.
In -Campbell v. MusartY' decedent bequeathed property to a charity
and died within one year after making his will. The question was
'AM. Jun- 622.
228 WAsH. U. LAw Q. 237 (1943).
31bid., 80 A.L.R. 1398.
4 137 Cal. 221, 159 Pac. 606 (1916).
5 Delano v. Brueston 148 Mass. 619, 20 N.E. 308 (1889).
6 Upson Admr., v. Noble 35 Ohio St. 655 (1880).
7Phillip v. McConica, 59 Ohio St. 1, 51 N.E. 445 (1898).
866 0. App. 549, 37 N.E. (2d) 546 (1940).
9 Frame v. Shaffer 27 0.0. 346, 13 0. Supp. 72 (1943).
10 131 N.E. 2d 279 (1956).
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whether plaintiff, decedent's natural grandson, was to be considered a
lineal descendant within the meaning of Ohio's Mortmain Statute after
plaintiff's adoption. Plaintiff could invalidate the bequest only if he
were a lineal descendant. The court relied on the broad language of the
Frantz case and held the bequest valid.
In both the CampbelU and Frantz cases the courts indicated that
equities of the parties or hardships resulting from the strict application of
the statute were irrelevant; and that, consequently, there would no court
-engraphed exceptions to the rule that an adopted child is to be treated
as a stranger with respect to inheritance from his natural relatives.
The Ohio statute cannot be considered as indicative of any strong
trend to restrict the inheritance rights of an adopted child to the property
of his natural parents or relatives."2 In 1943 there were five jurisdictions
which denied this right and now there are seven."' But of these seven,
two expressly preserve the rights of an adopted child to inherit from
relatives of a deceased parent where the surviving parent has remarried
and the step parent adopted the child.' 4
John F. Ramser
11 OHIO REV. CODE §2107.06.
1228 WASH. U. LAW. Q. 229 (1943).
13 The six in addition to Ohio are: CAL. PROBATE CODE, Section 257 (1955);
Supp. to CONN. GEN. STA'r., Tit. 55, Chap. 335, §2905 d (1955); Disriuar OF
COLUMBIA CODE, §16-222 (1954) ; DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 13, §919 (1951) ; ANN. Mo.
STAT., §453.090 (1947) ; PENNSYLVANIA STAT. ANN. Tit. 20, §102.
14 Supp. to CONN. GEN. STAT., Tit. 55, Chap. 335, §2905 d (1955); Disrmxcr
OF COLUMBIA CODE, §16-222 (1954).
TRIAL-REASSEMBLY OF JURY AFTER DISCHARGE
Two defendants charged with causing a miscarriage were found not
guilty by the jury which was then discharged and left the court room.
In the corridor, some of the jurors made known their disagreement with
the verdict and within approximately ten minutes of their discharge, the
trial judge had reassembled and directed them to deliberate further.
Unable to reach a verdict, the jury was finally discharged. On defendant's
motion to delete the trial book entry reflecting the jury's inability to agree
upon a verdict, the Law Division (Criminal) of the Hudson County
Court held that when the jury'rendered their verdict of not guilty,
were discharged and left the court room, the existence of the jury had
terminated and they could not be recalled to alter their verdict of not
guilty. The crucial element was the fact that the jury had been out of
the presence of the court. State v. Brandenburg, 38 N.J. Super. 561,
120 A. 2d 59 (1956).
The general rule is that once a jury has been permanently discharged
from a case, it cannot be reassembled to amend or correct the substance
of its verdict, but may be reassembled to correct or amend its verdict
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when the defect is one of form.' Since it is impossible to ascertain
definitely whether circumstances have so affected any jury as to render
them incompetent to deliberate further, courts have usually selected rules
of thumb to determine their continued independence and objectivity. Thus
when a verdict is returned and the jury is told it is discharged, reassembly
of that jury may depend on whether the jurors have left the presence
of the court, whether the case is civil or criminal, or whether the defect
is one of form or substance.2 The problem of whether a jury may or
may not be reassembled after discharge, should not be confused with
the question of whether the court may take cognizance of facts which
would warrant such action.3
Before the passage of legislation on this subject in Ohio, the courts
sharply distinguished between criminal and civil cases, and form and
substance when considering the problem of reassembling the jury.4 Ohio
had adopted the strict rule in criminal cases that once the jury is discharged
it may be recalled.' In 1853 Ohio adopted the Civil Code which pro-
vided that a jury had to be sent out to deliberate further if the verdict
was defective in substance, and that if a verdict was defective in form
only, the court could correct it with the assent of the jury before its dis-
charge.' In Boyer v. Maloney,' a leading case decided pursuant to the
166 A.L.R. 536 (1930).
2 Ibid.
3 The case of Vaise v. Delaval, 1 T.R. 11, 99 Eng. Rep. 944 (K.B. 1785)
established the rule which held that the verdict of a jury may not be impeached
by the evidence of a member of the jury unless a foundation for the introduction
of such evidence is first laid by evidence aliunde, i.e. evidence from some other
source. This rule is based on public policy which favors an end to litigation.
Vaise v. Delaval, supra. Ohio follows the English rule. Schwindt v. Graeff,
109 Ohio St. 404, 142 N.E. 736 (1924); Steiner v. Custer, 63 Ohio App. 440,
27 N.E. 2d 160 (1939), reversed on other grounds, 137 Ohio St. 448; Hutchinson,
Admx. v. Laughlin, 90 Ohio App. 5, 102 N.E. 2d 875 (1951) ; State v. Andlauer,
71 Ohio L. Abs. 449, 131 N.E. 2d 672 (1955). But see Boyer v. Maloney, 27 Ohio
App. 52, 160 N.E. 740 (1927) which indicated but did not decide that the rule
would not apply to mistakes by the jury in the nature of a clerical error. Cf.
The Cady-Iveson Shoe Co. v. Chicowicz, 24 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 53 (1905) which
held the verdict self impeached and admitted affidavits of the jurors.
4 In a civil case the trial judge could correct a clerical error in the verdict
after the jury had been discharged. Hammer v. McConnel, 2 Ohio 31 (1825).
Such verdicts could not be altered by courts of review. Hanley v. Levin, 5 Ohio
228 (1831). In a criminal case, the strict rule was applied forbidding the re-
assembly of the jury after discharge. Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472 (1842);
Helmerhing v. State, 10 Ohio Dec. Repring 444- (1852). But where a jury in a
civil case reached a verdict, which awarded interest but omitted its amount, put
it under seal and separated, it was said not to be error to reassemble the jury to
compute the interest. Sutliff v. Gilbert, 8 Ohio 405 (1838).
5 Sargent v. State, 11 Ohio 472 (1842).
6 Sections 273 and 274, 51 Ohio Laws 102 (now OHIO REv. CODE 2315.10 and
2315.11 respectively). For a discussion of these statutes see Lehrer v. Cleveland
Ry. Co., 20 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 481 (1918).
7 27 Ohio App. 52, 160 N.E. 740 (1927).
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statute, it was held error to recall the jury to poll it to determine whether
the verdict rendered was really its verdict. In that case the jury had filled
out the verdict form for the wrong party and rather than allowing the
jury to amend it, the court held that the proper procedure was to set
such verdict aside and grant a new trial.' The Boyer case seems to hold
that the statute impliedly prohibits reassembling of the jury after dis-
charge. However, a pre-Boyer case' decided pursuant to the statute held
that the court could reconvene the jury to continue their deliberations
even though some of the jurors had left the court room.
If the modem judicial trend is toward trial convenience and toward
ending litigation, it is difficult to see how the Ohio rule, as embodied in the
Boyer case fulfills these aims. A new trial required by a defect in form
is neither convenient nor consistent with a policy of ending litigation.
Not only are expenses increased, but the winning party is forced to risk
his verdict for correction of a mere error in form. The instant case
recognizes the desirability of allowing courts to use discretion to decide
this question. "This court is of the opinion that the words 'the jury is
discharged' do not in themselves terminate the case . ..a court should
not be so impotent to act after those words are uttered as to do an injustice
to the accused or the State."
10
Bruno E. Voltolini
8 See also American Express Co. v. Catlin, 2 Ohio L. Abs. 746 (1924);
Crawford v. Kellermier, 123 Ohio St. 404-, 175 N.E. 600 (1931); Ekleberry v.
Sanford, 73 Ohio App. 571, 57 N.E. 2d 270 (1943); cf. Guarantee & Finance Co.
v. Zenker, 20 Ohio Op. 312, 34 N.E. 2d 287 (1940) where it was held error for a
judge, sitting without a jury, to hear evidence on the value of an auto after entry
of final judgment. See also Bernhardt v. United States, 169 F. 2d 983 (6th Cir.
1948).
9 The Cady-Iveson Shoe Co. v. Chicowic?, 24 Ohio C.C.PL (n.s.) 53 (1903).
10 State v. Brandenburg, 38 N.J. Super. 561 (563), 120 A. 2d 59 (61) (1956).
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